There is nowadays unanimous agreement that spectrum should be allocated in a dynamic fashion so as to match the stochastic supply and demand by responding to spatiotemporal variations of spectrum availability and request. The imminent liberalization of the spectrum markets is expected to provide more control mechanisms for spectrum exploitation in that respect. Wireless network entities will be able to trade, resell, lease or contribute their resources to a common spectrum pool. In these emerging dynamic spectrum markets there will be many involved entities with diverse and conflicting objectives and hence their success relies on employing proper market-clearing mechanisms. However, designing economicsinspired spectrum management schemes for the dynamic spectrum markets is a challenging task since the objective of the designer is twofold: ensure the socially desirable efficient spectrum utilization and allow interacting entities to accrue monetary or other benefits from participating in these markets.
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Abstract
There is nowadays unanimous agreement that spectrum should be allocated in a dynamic fashion so as to match the stochastic supply and demand by responding to spatiotemporal variations of spectrum availability and request. The imminent liberalization of the spectrum markets is expected to provide more control mechanisms for spectrum exploitation in that respect. Wireless network entities will be able to trade, resell, lease or contribute their resources to a common spectrum pool. In these emerging dynamic spectrum markets there will be many involved entities with diverse and conflicting objectives and hence their success relies on employing proper market-clearing mechanisms. However, designing economicsinspired spectrum management schemes for the dynamic spectrum markets is a challenging task since the objective of the designer is twofold: ensure the socially desirable efficient spectrum utilization and allow interacting entities to accrue monetary or other benefits from participating in these markets.
In this chapter, we start by outlining the peculiar characteristics that distinguish the dynamic spectrum markets from other commodity markets and from traditional spectrum markets. We then discuss auction-based mechanisms since they are expected to constitute one of the basic methods for selling spectrum. Auctions are the most suitable market mechanisms for allocating resources when there is limited information about buyers' valuation for the resource. We analyze the properties of different auction schemes and discuss the challenges in designing such mechanisms for dynamic spectrum markets. We study hierarchical spectrum allocation schemes that are expected to proliferate in these multi-layer markets. Using simple examples it is explained that lack of coordination and the different objectives of the entities in different layers induce an inefficient overall spectrum allocation. We discuss the necessity of devising novel mechanisms that address these issues. Another important aspect of dynamic spectrum markets is that each operator and user will be both a spectrum seller and a spectrum buyer. The existence of multiple dual-role network entities calls for double auction spectrum allocation mechanisms. Unlike typical double auctions, in this case the employed schemes should be lightweight and amenable to decentralized execution. A mechanism that satisfies these requirements is presented.
Introduction
Today there exists growing consensus among network theoreticians and practitioners that current spectrum management methodologies are not adequate for handling the prospective orders of magnitude increase of wireless network components and the envisioned huge circulated volume of data. These methods rely on the premise of statically pre-allocated spectrum chunks, each of which is dedicated exclusively to one service or technology. However, it is now obvious that these coarse allocation policies render spectrum a scarce and expensive resource. The increasing demand for spectrum and related wireless services cannot be satisfied while, at the same time, spectrum remains often idle and unexploited by its legitimate owners. These observations have spurred a flurry of discussions and debates about the spectrum management policy. Nevertheless, all spectrum policy reform proposals agree that spectrum regulation should be more dynamic and flexible. Specifically, it is proposed that the state should grant spectrum licences in different time and spatial ranges, and moreover the licence holders should be able to resell their idle spectrum channels (Peha & Panichpapiboon 2004) . This dynamic spectrum allocation model will give rise to dynamic spectrum markets where spectrum will become a rapidly traded commodity, among different and heterogeneous network entities, often in a decentralized fashion. Dynamic spectrum markets are expected to eventually increase spectrum utilization and hence improve spectrum availability.
Interestingly, several related business models already exist in the market. For example, spectrum bridge (Bridge 2010 ) is a company that provides an online marketplace where spectrum can be sold or leased in real-time fashion by the interested parties. The latter can be operators, service providers, wireless ISPs or any public or private entity which needs spectrum access. Moreover, nowadays technology offers the means to trade or exchange spectrum even in a smaller scale. For example, there exist several smartphones that can share their 3G connection and operate as mobile WiFi hot-spots by offering internet-connectivity services to other devices. Clearly, this type of spectrum and bandwidth exchange brings new challenges for policy makers and network designers who must devise novel spectrum trading schemes. In these markets, auctions are expected to become one of the prevalent methods for spectrum management and allocation.
Auctioning spectrum is not a new idea. Actually, the first spectrum auction was organized in New Zealand in 1990 for selling television (TV) spectrum bands. Since then, auctions evolved into a very popular method for allocating spectrum licences and many countries around the world have run spectrum auctions with remarkable results in terms of revenue. The major advantage of auctions compared to traditional market mechanisms, is that they manage to elicit the hidden information about the demand of buyers. For example, traditional pricing schemes may result in low revenue, if seller sets low prices, or in zero revenue if prices are very high and items remain unsold. On the other hand, auctions lead to allocation of items to buyers with the highest valuations and at the same time to substantial increase of seller's revenue. Moreover, they require minimum interaction among sellers and buyers since the latter simply have to declare their preferences about auctioned items. These properties render auctions a very attractive market mechanism for trading network resources and specifically spectrum. Nevertheless, designing auction-based mechanisms for the emerging dynamic spectrum markets is an intricate task due to the particular characteristics of these markets.
Specifically, in dynamic spectrum markets regulators will organize auctions for selling spectrum licences to the so-called primary operators (PO) in a finer spatiotemporal scale. Apart from serving primary users (PUs), the POs will lease unused bandwidth to secondary operators (SOs). The latter will be able to serve secondary users in their range without the need to invest money for licences. Secondary users (SUs) will have to pay lower prices but will probably receive services of lower quality. Moreover, they will have the opportunity to form clusters and jointly satisfy their communication needs by routing each others traffic in an ad-hoc fashion. Clearly, in these markets there will be many different scenarios for spectrum allocation (Akyildiz, Lee, Vuran & Mohanty 2006) . The common denominator is the freedom of the various entities to trade spectrum at their own will and in the presence of limited information about spectrum demand. In Figure 1 .1, a schematic representation of the spectrum sharing interactions between primary/secondary operators and users is depicted.
It is obvious that spectrum trading in dynamic spectrum markets poses new challenges in auction design. Unlike traditional auctions organized by state agencies, the auctioneer in these cases can be any operator or even a user who is willing to exchange his spectrum. Light-weight mechanisms are needed, with minimum communication overhead among involved entities. These auctions differ in substantial ways from respective schemes where other assets are sold and from traditional static spectrum auctions. Specifically:
1. Spatial Properties of Spectrum. In dynamic spectrum markets it is expected that many networks will cover small areas, and therefore channel allocation will be a more complicated task compared to the one in traditional wireless networks. Spectrum can be reused by operators which are not in adjacent cells or, in general, in near-located cells. Auctions should consider the spatial dimension and the fact that there may be many winners to which spectrum should be concurrently allocated.
2. Qualitative Characteristics of Spectrum. Spectrum bands differ in terms of quality due to inherent frequency selectivity of the wireless channel and the time-varying link characteristics. These quality properties must be taken into account in the spectrum allocation process.
3. Dynamics of Spectrum Demand. The heterogeneity and unpredictability of user demand and user mobility place additional challenges. Spectrum must 
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Bandwidth Exchange Figure 1 .1 Dynamic spectrum sharing: a government institution allocates spectrum channels to a set of primary operators (POs). The POs serve their users and resell/lease unutilized spectrum to a set of secondary operators (SOs). These in turn, provide services to a set of secondary users. Operators and users can exchange spectrum and bandwidth to satisfy their rapidly varying spectrum needs.
be allocated in a fine-grained spatiotemporal fashion, i.e., for small geographic areas and short time periods. 4. Decentralized and Dynamic Spectrum Allocation. The small-scale dynamic spectrum allocation renders the machinery of bidding, allocation and payment a challenging task. They must be amenable to distributed and almost real-time execution. 5. Provision in Secondary Markets. Spectrum will not be exclusively sold by state agencies like FCC and OfCom. Instead, in this context, each operator has a double role since he is both a spectrum buyer and a spectrum seller. Namely, each operator in order to satisfy his increased needs buys additional spectrum from other operators while leases his idle spectrum to other operators when he faces low demand. This type of market transactions already take place (Bridge 2010) and there is evidence that will proliferate in the future. 6. Hierarchical Spectrum Allocation. The emergence of secondary spectrum markets will give rise to hierarchical spectrum allocation schemes. In every layer, a set of entities (operators or brokers) request some spectrum which they may resell (as a whole or parts) to operators or users in another layer. In these cases, the interaction of entities in two successive layers affects the utility of entities in other layers.
We first study the hierarchical spectrum allocation schemes that are expected to proliferate in dynamic spectrum markets. Interestingly, there already exist settings where spectrum is allocated hierarchically. For example, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) lease spectrum from Mobile Network Operators (MNO), the actual buyers of spectrum licenses, and use it to serve their own clients. In this kind of hierarchical markets, the different objectives of operators in the different layers as well as their different spectrum needs often result in inefficient spectrum overall allocation. Traditional two party auction schemes are inadequate to address issues that arise in this context since there exist multiple (more than two) classes of entities which, moreover, often have conflicting objectives. Clearly, there is need for devising novel spectrum allocation mechanisms which will convey the information about the actual spectrum demand from the lower layer to the higher layer of the hierarchy in order to enable the efficient top-to-down spectrum allocation.
Accordingly, we analyze the double role of each entity as resource provider and resource consumer. In dynamic spectrum markets and specifically in secondary markets, every entity becomes both a buyer and a seller and submits requests for new channels while at the same time offers his idle spectrum. Secondary operators will be able to directly interact and satisfy their dynamic needs by redistributing the spectrum they have leased from POs. Also, users may trade their channel licences or exchange bandwidth by routing each other's traffic in an ad-hoc fashion. These many-to-many interactions can be captured by double auction mechanisms. These scenarios require the development of mechanisms which are amenable to distributed execution and have low computational and communication requirements. It is assumed that there is perfect competition and therefore the participating entities are price-takers. That is, each single buyer or seller cannot estimate the impact of his bidding strategy on the market prices, either because there are too many market players and the impact of each one of them is infinitesimal or because he has limited information about the auctioned items and the needs of the other players.
Auction theory fundamentals
Auction theory constitutes a rich tool for designing market-clearing mechanisms. However, the selection or design of the proper auction mechanism for each problem is an intricate task. One should take into account the produced seller revenue and the market efficiency as well as the computational complexity and communication requirements of the auction mechanism (Krishna 2010) . In the brief introduction below, we focus on the design objective of auctions. If the auctioneer is a social-aware entity such as a state regulatory agency, e.g. FCC or Ofcom, he is expected to select an efficient auction that ensures maximization of social welfare. On the other hand, if the auctioneer is a market entity, he will solely maximize his revenue. We discuss some basic auction schemes and analyze two prominent mechanisms that are suitable for efficient and revenue-maximizing auctions: the VCG and optimal mechanisms.
Auction design objectives
A first meaningful criterion for performance assessment of auctions is the auctioneer revenue. An auction should be designed so as to foster competition, inducing bidders to participate and submit high bids, and increasing expected price at which the item is sold. Another criterion is efficiency of the auction. For one item, this is equivalent to allocating it to the buyer who values it most. This instance arises when a governmental institution auctions a public good, and it is sought to allocate it to the most appropriate bidder. For multiple indivisible goods or one divisible good, efficiency is equivalent to maximizing social welfare produced by the allocation. Apparently, efficient auctions presume the truthful bidding of buyers. Maximizing auctioneer revenue and achieving high efficiency of the allocation may be conflicting objectives (Myerson 1981) . A method to increase revenue is the adoption of a reserve price, namely a minimum (publicly announced) price at which the item is sold. One may counterbalance the risk of not selling the item with the higher payment if the item is sold, to compute the optimal reserve price that maximizes expected revenue (Krishna 2010, Ch.2.5) . It can be shown that the expected gain from setting a small reserve price exceeds expected loss. However, one should keep in mind that any effort to maximize revenue may have undesired effect on allocation efficiency as we will explain below.
For many indivisible goods or one divisible good, fairness is another objective, which is related to certain properties of the vector of allocated quantities or the vector of obtained utilities. Other auction design objectives are promotion of truthful reporting of bidder valuations, bidder attraction, discouragement of collusion and simplicity of mechanism (Klemperer 2004, Ch.3) . In the sequel we present some basic auction schemes and discuss their efficiency and produced revenue for the auctioneer.
Revenue and efficiency for some basic single-item auctions
In Figure 1 .2 we present the machinery and the basic properties of three prevalent single-item auctions. Our goal is to discuss the produced revenue and the efficiency for each one of them (Krishna 2010, Ch.4) . Assume that each bidder i = 1, . . . , N has valuation V i for the item, where V i is a random variable with cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) 
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x Optimal Auctions use reserve prices and maximize expected revenue of the seller. They require knowledge of the valuations probability distribution function F(·).
x First price auctions often ensure higher revenue than second price auctions.
x Second price auctions, unlike first price auctions, induce truthful bidding and hence are always efficient. 
Second-price auctions
In second-price auctions, the item is allocated to the bidder with the highest bid and the winner pays a price equal to the second highest bid. Therefore, the net payoff U i (·) of bidder i who participates in the auction with bid b i is:
Second-price auctions are always truthful, i.e. for each buyer bidding his actual valuation, i.e. b i (v i ) = v i is a dominant strategy (Krishna 2010) . Therefore, these auctions always ensure the efficient allocation of auctioned items. Let us compute the expected payment by a bidder. Fix a winner, say i. Call V = V i his random valuation, and let Z = max j =i V j be the second highest valuation (therefore, bid) that will be paid by i. Denote by G(·) and g(·) the c.d.f and p.d.f of Z. Suppose v is the winner valuation. We wish to compute the conditional p.d.f. of Z given that i wins,
Pr (Z<v) if 0 < z < v, and it is 1, if 0 < v < z. Then,
The conditional expected payment given that i wins is:
The expected payment for valuation X = x is therefore,
. One may also average over randomness of valuations to obtain the total average payment,
Further, the total expected revenue of the seller is N E[Z].
First-price auctions
In first-price auctions the winner pays a price equal to his bid. Hence, the net payoff of a bidder is:
In (Krishna 2010, Proposition 2.2) it is shown that the optimal symmetric bidding strategy is
, where Z = max j =i V j as before. The expected payment to the seller for given winner valuation
. This is equal to the expected payment for the second-price auction in (1.2). The same holds for the seller's expected revenue. It can be shown that the total expected revenue is equal to the expectation of the second highest valuation for both the first-and the second-price auction. This is known as the Revenue Equivalence principle and holds under certain assumptions. In general though, the first-price auction ensures higher revenue and with less risk for achieving it. However, the auction scheme that yields the maximum possible revenue for the seller is the optimal auction.
Optimal auction mechanisms
Reserve prices increase the revenue of the auctioneer. Myerson, was the first one who systematically studied how they should be selected, (Myerson 1981) .
He applied concepts from mechanism design and proposed the so-called optimal auctions which ensure the maximum expected revenue for selling one single item. For each bidder i who submits a bid b i , the auctioneer calculates the optimal reservation price by using F (·) and f (·). This price is subtracted from the actual submitted bid in order to calculate the virtual valuation (virtual bid) Φ i (b i ):
Given the virtual valuations of the bidders, an optimal auction simply allocates the item to the bidder with the maximum non-negative virtual bid. Notice that a negative virtual bid means that the bidder has submitted a bid which is lower than the reserve price and hence he is actually excluded from the auction. The winner pays the minimum bid that it is required to deem his virtual bid winning. Therefore, the net payoff for each bidder is:
where:b
Although optimal auctions ensure truthful bidding, they may yield inefficient allocation for two reasons. First, if all virtual bids are negative the item remains unsold despite the existence of positive actual valuations. Moreover, in the case of asymmetric bidders, i.e. F i (·) = F j (·) for i = j, it is probable that the highest virtual bid will not represent the highest actual valuation (Krishna 2010) . Obviously, there exists a tradeoff among allocative efficiency and revenue maximization in auctions, (Abhishek & Hajek 2010 ).
Multiple-item auctions
In multiple object auctions, multiple items are to be sold. These auctions are classified as homogeneous (or multi-unit ) and heterogeneous, depending on whether items are units of the same good, or they are different goods. Homogeneous auctions may be uniform-price or discriminatory-price ones, depending on whether identical items are sold at the same price or not for different bidders. If items are auctioned one at a time as single-item auctions, the auction is called sequential. If all items are sold simultaneously, the auction is called simultaneous. Finally, auctions are individual if bidders can bid only at one item, and combinatorial if bids are allowed to combinations of items (Courcoubetis & Weber 2003, Ch.14.2) . Multi-unit auction models also capture auctions of a single divisible good. We consider this class of auction models below. The results can be extended to discrete models with slight modifications.
Auctions for a divisible resource
In this class of auctions, each bidder i submits a continuous bid function b i (x) that indicates the amount he is willing to pay for resource amount x. Such a scenario is encountered in network resource sharing, where the good may be the spectrum of a certain band, power, energy or another type of resource. An amount C of divisible resource is to be allocated among N users. Each user i is characterized by a strictly concave, increasing, continuous differentiable utility function U i (·) which is only privately known to him but unknown to the allocation controller. Let x i be the amount of good allocated to user i and x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) be an allocation vector. The social welfare maximization (SWM) problem is:
subject to:
If utility functions were known to the controller, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions would give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal allocation,
. . , N , where λ * is the optimal Lagrange multiplier for (1.6).
Proportional allocation mechanism
Assume that the controller does not know utility functions U i (·) but aims at socially optimal allocation. Consider the class of allocation mechanisms where each user submits a bid b i ≥ 0 for the amount he is willing to pay and is charged according to function c(·). The amount of allocated good, x i (b i ) is a function of the user bid. Specifically, let x i (b i ) = b i /λ, whereλ is a price per unit of resource. We assume users are price takers, namely they do not consider the impact of their bid on the charge function c(·). It is reasonable to assume that each user is rational and casts his bid so as to maximize his net benefit,
Namely, his bid should satisfy:
Suppose the controller obtains bidsb i and makes the allocation according to the solution of the following problem (P):
x i = C, and x i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N . The KKT conditions for this problem give:
whereλ,x, is the optimal Lagrange multiplier and the optimal solution respectively of (P). The goal is to equalize the solutions of optimization problems (SWM) and (P). It turns out that if each user is charged according to c(
). Since the optimal solution to (P) should satisfy
. This is the market-clearing price, set by the controller.
( 1.10) namely the allocated amount to each user is proportional to its bid (Kelly 1997) . Therefore, socially optimal resource allocation can be achieved by bidding (where each user's bid is a single number), and an appropriate charging scheme. Kelly et al. proposed this mechanism and showed that the problem above can be solved in a decentralized fashion (Kelly, Maulloo & Tan 1998) . The marketclearing price λ (n) is iteratively computed at each step n by the auctioneer according to a standard dual algorithm. Essentially, it is increased or decreased, depending on whether the instantaneous allocation exceeds C or not. Then, each user adjusts its bid according to
The dual price update together with the user response converges to the optimal solution of the network utility maximization problem. This algorithm is a distributed implementation of the bidding mechanism.
The conclusion is that for price-taking users, one-dimensional bids and appropriate charging lead to efficient allocation. However, if users are more sophisticated or informed and can act in a strategic fashion, this mechanism is not adequate. Namely, consider that bidders are price-anticipating, i.e. they strategically adapt their bid by taking into account its impact on the price so that they maximize net profit. In this case, it is proved in (Johari & Tsitsiklis 2004 ) that the proportional allocation mechanism of Kelly induces a welfare loss at least of 25% compared to the efficient allocation.
Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism
Consider now achieving an efficient allocation for price-anticipating users. In this case, a game interaction emerges with certain efficiency loss. The setup is the same as the one above, and each user chooses his bid to maximize the quantity:
Notice now that user i explicitly understands that the price,
also on its own bid b i . A mechanism that guarantees an efficient allocation for selfish, price-anticipating users is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Clark 1973) , (Groves 1973) . This is a generalization of the Vickrey mechanism for single item auctions. Here, the compromise is that the auctioneer requests each user to reveal his utility function. In the VCG mechanism, the amount charged to each user i is the externality he causes to others. This is the total utility reduction caused by i to all other users, and it is computed as follows. Let x * be the optimal solution to (SWM) problem, and letx be the optimal solution to the (SWM) problem without considering the effect of user i, namely to problem max x N j =i U j (x j ), such that N j =i x j = C. The charge to user i is:
(1.12)
In VCG mechanisms, declaration of the true utility function U i (·) is the best strategy for each user (Shakkottai & Srikant 2007, Ch.6 ). Namely, a user i cannot do better by misreporting his utility function. To see this, observe that the net profit for a user i that declares his true utility function is,
(1.13) Suppose now that user i misreported his utility function and declared it asŨ i (·) in an effort to get more profit. In that case, there would be a different solution (call itx) to the (SWM) problem, and the profit of user i would be
(1.14)
If truthful reporting of utility were not optimal, (1.14) should exceed (1.13), which would mean
). This contradicts the fact that x * is the optimal solution of the (SWM) problem. Thus, truthful reporting is optimal under VCG and hence efficient allocation is ensured.
Its drawback is that each user needs to submit to the auctioneer his entire utility function, namely an infinitely dimensional vector, which renders the mechanism quite complex and burdensome in terms of information exchange. Additionally, the computational complexity of VCG mechanisms is very high. Especially if the auctioned items are discrete and non-homogeneous, the respective allocation problems are NP-hard. Finally, in many cases, VCG mechanisms are not budget-balanced. That is, the sum of the payments and the reimbursements is not zero. In this case the auctioneer has to inject additional money to the market. Fortunately, for single-sided auctions where the bidders have non-saturated demand, VCG auctions are weak budget balance which means that all bidders submit positive payments to the auctioneer.
In order to reduce the amount of information exchange in VCG auctions, it was recently proposed to combine VCG and proportional allocation methods (Yang & Hajek 2007) , (Johari & Tsitsiklis 2005) . In these works, nodes submit one-dimensional bids and are charged according to the VCG rule. Other singlesided auction methods where many buyers submit bids for the resource provided by one seller are (Dimakis, Jain & Walrand 2006) , (Semret 1999) , where a twodimensional bid, i.e. a per-unit price and the maximum amount of resource the user is willing to buy, is submitted. This bid corresponds to a specific class of utility functions. The charging is performed as in VCG auctions, and the allocation is according to the total utility maximization problem.
Optimal auctions of multiple items
The single-item optimal auction introduced by Myerson, was later extended for one perfectly divisible item by Maskin, (Maksin & Riley 1989) , and for the case of multiple homogeneous items by Branco, (Branco 1996) . Consider a market where an auctioneer aims to sell K items to a set of N buyers. It is assumed that valuations of buyers are scalar-parameterized. Namely, each bidder i has a valuation of U k (α i ) units for acquiring one additional channel, the k th . Parameter α i ∈ R + is a random variable, drawn from a c.d.f. F (·), and models the spectrum needs of the bidder. The functions U k (·), k = 1, 2, . . . , K, are common for all bidders. In order to run an optimal auction for selling multiple items, the auctioneer must have some initial information. Namely, he needs to know the family of bidders' utility functions U k (α i ) and the distribution function F (·) of their types, α i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Buyers submit a single bid b i to declare their types. The auctioneer combines this bid with the prior information and calculates the additional expected revenue he will receive by assigning a certain item, e.g. the k th item out of K, to a certain buyer, e.g. buyer i. This amount is known as the contribution of the bidder for buying the k th item, and is defined as:
If these contributions are monotonically strictly increasing in the types of the buyers, and decreasing in the number of auctioned items, then they satisfy the so-called regularity conditions, (Branco 1996) , and the auction is called regular. In this case the item allocation that maximizes seller's expected revenue can be easily derived using the following deterministic allocation and payment rules.
Optimal auction allocation rule. The auctioneer calculates the contributions π k (b i ) of each buyer i ∈ N for all auctioned items, k = 1, 2, . . . , K and selects the K highest of them. In the sequel, he constructs the contribution vector X K which has K elements in decreasing order:
Then, the auctioneer simply assigns each item k = 1, . . . , K to the respective bidder i if
Optimal auction payment rule. The price that each bidder i pays for receiving the k th item depends on the bids submitted by all the other bidders, b −i . Let us denote with z k (b −i ) the minimum bid that buyer i has to submit in order to acquire the k th item (Branco 1996) :
This means that in order to get the k th item, bidder i has simply to submit a bid high enough to draft his contribution within the first K elements of X K . The actual charged price for each item is equal to his valuation had he a type equal to this minimum bid. Hence the aggregate payment for all items bidder i receives is:
Double auctions
In case there exist more than one sellers and there is lack of information both about demand and supply, it is required to employ double auction mechanisms. Sellers compete with each other in order to attract buyers, while the latter are able to place bids to several sellers. These markets are usually cleared by an independent entity that undertakes the role of the auctioneer. The buyers submit ask bids, revealing the amount of money they are willing to pay. Similarly, sellers submit offer bids indicating the minimum offer they are willing to accept. The task of the auctioneer is to collect all bids, determine winning sellers, allocate items from sellers to buyers and compute the prices each seller must be paid and each buyer must be charged. Designing a double auction is an intricate task and the related literature is limited. One of the most prevalent double auction schemes is the McAfee auction model, (McAfee 1992) which ensures truthful bidding both for the buyers and the sellers. However, in this scheme it is not always possible for the auctioneer to match requests and offers and at the same time ensure efficient allocation of items. Double auctions can be asynchronous, also called Continuous Double Auctions (CDA) (Courcoubetis & Weber 2003) , or synchronous. In the former case, the ask and offer bids can be submitted or retracted anytime and unilaterally. On the contrary, in synchronized auctions, the submitted bids are binding and active until the market is cleared by the auctioneer. Double auctions are used extensively in stock and other commodities markets.
Sponsored search auctions
A particularly interesting class of auctions are the sponsored search auctions (SSA), which are used by web search engines for Internet advertising. In these auctions the bidders are the advertisers who wish to have the advertisement of their company appearing on a user's search results screen after he types a related keyword. Advertisements appear in the end-user search results as a ranked list.
The user clicks on an advertisement and he is taken to the advertiser's website. Advertisement positions (ranked slots) on search results are clearly of high importance to advertisements; the higher the ad is displayed on the list, the more probable it is that it will be clicked by the user, and the more likely it becomes that the advertiser will get some profit if user buys the product or service. The underlying feature of these auctions is that there exist two parties, the auctioneer and the bidders, who determine the rules of the auction. Bidders cast their bids, and the auctioneer determines the allocation of items and the payment. Clearly, ad auctions are different in that the auctioneer revenue and bidder payoff depend on a third entity, the Internet user. This idea is similar to the well known score auctions where the bids are weighted with various parameters which characterize the quality of the bidders. However, with the explosion of the web, such schemes are applied today extensively. Namely, Google, Yahoo! and other search engines auction advertising positions using this class of auction mechanisms. Google (Google 2006) was the first to consider the dependency of position allocation and payment on user preferences.
Let us now give a brief overview of the SSA machinery. Consider N advertisers who bid for K < N ad slots for a specific keyword. Let u i be the value of the ad for advertiser i, i = 1, . . . , N . Let b i be the bid of advertiser i and p i be the payment per click he will be charged. The auctioneer collects submitted bids and needs to decide which bidders will have their ads shown, in which order and the respective payments. Let c ij denote the probability that the ad of advertiser i will be clicked by a user when in position j, j = 1, . . . , K. This is also called clickthrough rate (CTR) and can be calculated by the search engine based on history statistics with various methods (Narahari, Garg, Narayanam & Prakash 2009, Ch.3) . CTR depends on the ad of advertiser i and the position j and can be assumed to be c ij = α i β j , where α i an ad-dependent parameter, the per-ad CTR (the ratio of number of clicks received by the ad over the number of times the ad was displayed). It is α i = K j=1 c ij y ij , where y ij is the probability that ad i is displayed in position j. Also, β j is a position-dependent parameter, the per-position CTR. Higher ranked positions are more visible to users and attract more attention, so that β 1 > . . . > β K .
Each advertiser i chooses a bid b i . Ads of advertisers appear in ad slots in decreasing order of their weighted bid, b i α i . The advertiser in the k-th position, with weighted bid b (k) α (k) pays a total amount equal to the weighted bid of the advertiser in the next position k + 1, that is, total amount b (k+1) α (k+1) . Hence, the amount paid per click is
The last ranked advertiser either pays a reserve price if N < K or the amount of bid of the first omitted advertiser if N > K. The position allocation rule naturally ranks bidders in a decreasing order of expected revenues.
The probability that a user will click on an ad is a key factor to consider. Otherwise, less attractive ads will be displayed, and small revenue for the auctioneer will be incurred. Assume that bidders are risk-neutral. The net payoff for advertiser i when his ad is displayed in position j is c ij (u i − p i ), where p i is the payment per click. From the perspective of the auctioneer, the problem is to find the position allocation that maximizes expected revenue (Narahari et al. 2009 ):
. . , N , and
x ij = 1 for j = 1, . . . , K, where X is the N × K assignment matrix with x ij = 1 if the i-th advertiser is allotted position j, and x ij = 0 otherwise. If the auctioneer wants to maximize efficiency, he solves the assignment problem:
subject to the allocation constraints above. The auctioneer does not know valuations u i and uses submitted bids, which may differ from valuations. For both revenue maximization and allocation efficiency, it is crucial to consider CTRs.
1.3
Hierarchical spectrum auctions
Background
An important feature of the emerging dynamic spectrum markets is that spectrum distribution will become a multi-layer resource allocation process. In each layer, a set of entities (operators, brokers or users) request spectrum which they may resell (as a whole or parts) to operators or users in another layer. The interaction of entities between two successive layers affects the utility of entities in other layers. That is, there is an interdependency among layers. However, the different objectives of operators and users in the different layers, as well as their different transmission capabilities and spectrum needs can result in inefficient spectrum allocation or revenue loss. Apparently, there is a need for mechanisms that will align the incentives of the various entities and enable their coordination. Clearly, traditional two-party auction schemes are inadequate to capture and address issues that arise in this context. Two examples of such multi-layer interactions are presented in Figure 1 .3. On the left side we depict the hierarchical spectrum allocation from a government agency, the controller (CO), to a set of primary operators (POs) who in turn lease their idle channels to secondary operators (SOs). The challenge for the controller is to allocate the channels to POs with the higher aggregate spectrum needs and spectrum demand in their respective secondary market. This is a difficult task since probably the CO is not aware of the secondary spectrum demand, i.e. the needs of SOs. One would expect that POs will convey this information from the lower to the upper layer of the hierarchy. However, the POs are market entities and hence their objective is to maximize their total benefit from using the channels and reselling them to the SOs. As it is explained below, this strategy of POs induces an inefficient channel allocation in the first stage of the hierarchical allocation, i.e. from the controller to POs. Additionally, the channel redistribution by POs yields an outcome that does not always coincide with the socially aware channel allocation. To alleviate these problems, the controller must deploy new auction mechanisms that take into account the SOs' needs.
Another instance of a multi-layer hierarchical interaction is among the POs, the SOs and the secondary users (SU), depicted on the right side of Figure 1 .3. Again, each PO wishes to sell unused spectrum to a set of secondary operators. The SOs submit bids and the POs determine the payments and channel allocation. The appropriateness of this allocation depends on the experience of the SUs. Obviously, it is not desirable to allocate certain channels to SOs which would in turn assign them to users for which the specific frequency is of low quality, either due to interference from excessive frequency reuse or due to limited range of the specific SOs. In other words, the PO has to determine the most suitable SO for each specific channel. Therefore it is imperative to have a mechanism that will enable the coordination of entities in all layers of this hierarchy. Moreover, in some settings the SUs may be also clients of POs, (Kasbekar & Sarkar 2010) , and hence the latter have an additional incentive to take into account the user preferences. In order to ensure the overall efficient allocation of channels, the POs should consider the feedback from users about the quality of services they received from each SO.
Examples of inefficient hierarchical spectrum allocation
The inefficiency induced by the hierarchical allocation of channels can become clear through the following examples. Consider the 2-layer spectrum market depicted in the left side of Figure 1 .4. The state agency, i.e. the Controller (CO), has K = 3 channels at his disposal which are initially allocated to primary operators (POs). Each PO may use a channel for his own needs or resell it to SOs in his underneath secondary market. We assume that each operator, either PO or SO, is interested only in one channel. We consider monopoly markets in the sense that each SO can bid only to a specific primary operator. Monopolies are expected to arise often in these markets because the POs obtain the exclusive spectrum use rights for certain areas or because they collude and act effectively as one single seller. Moreover, we consider that channel allocation in the two layers is synchronized. That is, we assume that the needs of the POs and SOs vary in the same time scale and the channels are allocated to them for the same time period. We later discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption. The channel valuation of P O 1 for using one channel for his own needs is V 1 = 8 units while the channel valuation of P O 2 is V 2 = 9 units. Similarly, the SOs have valuations of U 1 = 3, U 2 = 5, U 3 = 2 and U 4 = 8 units. It is assumed that the allocation of channels in both layers of the hierarchy is accomplished through a Vickrey (second-price) auction. Focus on P O 1 . The maximum revenue he can accrue is equal to 3 units from reselling one channel to SO 2 . Therefore, primary operator P O 1 will use the first channel he will obtain for his own needs and will resell the second channel to the secondary market. The same strategy will be followed by P O 2 . His valuation is 9 units while the maximum revenue for reselling one channel to SO 3 is 2 units.
In the second-price auction organized by the controller (CO), POs bid in order to obtain two channels. Since this is a truthful auction, the POs' bids will reveal their actual benefit from receiving each channel. Therefore, the bid of P O 1 for the first and the second channel are given by vector b 1 = [8, 3] . Similarly, the bid of P O 2 is b 2 = [9, 2]. The result is that P O 1 receives 2 channels, one of which is resold to SO 2 , and P O 2 receives 1 channel which is used for his own needs. The final channel allocation is marked with circles (each one represents a channel) and yields a social welfare of SW = (8 + 5) + 9 = 24 units. However, this is not an efficient allocation since SO 4 , who does not receive a channel, has a higher valuation (8 units) from SO 2 (5 units). Clearly, this efficiency loss is induced by the strategy of the POs who bid in accordance with their anticipated revenue and not with respect to the welfare of their secondary markets. Therefore P O 1 gets more channels than P O 2 although the latter has higher secondary demand.
The problem becomes even more interesting if we revisit the strategy of the primary operators. Namely, a question that naturally arises in this context is what type of auction the POs will employ in order to redistribute their channels. Most probably the primary operators will not employ a second-price auction, as it was discussed previously. The scheme that maximizes the seller's expected
K=4 Channels Figure 1 .4 Inefficient channel allocation in a 2-layer spectrum market. Each square represents a channel when they are allocated efficiently. Each circle corresponds to an assigned channel when they are allocated hierarchically. Each operator, PO or SO, needs only one channel.
revenue is the optimal auction mechanism. Nevertheless, this type of auctions will induce significant efficiency loss in this hierarchical spectrum allocation. Consider for example the hierarchical allocation of K = 4 channels depicted on the right side of Figure 1 .4. Assume that the valuations of SOs follow a uniform distribution with c.d.f. F (u) = u/10, which is known to POs. Each PO runs a single-item optimal auction. Focus on P O 1 . He receives the truthful bids of SO 1 and SO 2 and calculates their virtual bids given by:
which yields Φ 1 (3) = −4, and Φ 2 (4) = 0. According to the optimal auction allocation rule this means that P O 1 will not sell channels to SOs in his secondary market. Therefore the bids of this PO in the upper layer auction organized by the CO will be b 1 = [8, 0] . Similarly, primary operator P O 2 calculates the virtual bids Φ 3 (2) = −6 and Φ 4 (8) = 6 for the secondary operators SO 3 and SO 4 respectively. Therefore, he submits to controller a vector bid b 2 = [9, 6] .
Given this strategy of POs, we can understand why optimal auctions will induce an inefficient hierarchical channel allocation. If the controller has K = 3 channels, then he will allocate two of them to P O 2 and one in P O 1 . The POs will reallocate the channels by comparing their own valuations and the virtual valuations (virtual bids) of SOs. Interestingly, unlike the previous example, this strategy will yield an efficient outcome. However, POs are only interested for K = 3 channels. Namely, despite the fact that SO 1 and SO 2 have positive channel valuations, P O 1 will not resell them any channels since his expected revenue (the virtual valuations) is zero. P O 1 is interested only in 1 channel. The efficient allocation of K = 4 channels is marked with squares while the respective inefficient allocation is represented with circles.
The inefficiency could be worse if bidders were asymmetric. Assume that the SOs in the market of P O 1 have valuations drawn from a uniform distribution F (u) = u/5, while the SOs in the market of P O 2 have valuations that follow a different distribution, say F (u) = u/12. In this case, the ordering of SOs' virtual valuations is different than the ordering of their actual valuations:
In conclusion, the overall hierarchical spectrum allocation is inefficient when POs use an optimal auction for two reasons. First, the POs allocate the items to bidders with the highest expected payment and not to those with the highest valuations. This strategy possibly induces an inefficient channel allocation from the controller to the POs in the first stage of the channel allocation. Second, POs do not assign an item to a secondary operator with negative (or zero) virtual bid, although his actual valuation (and bid) may be positive. This strategy renders the overall channel allocation even less efficient.
Related work
Before discussing possible methods for addressing these issues, it is interesting to study the related work in the area of hierarchical spectrum and bandwidth markets. Recently, there is renewed interested for auction-based spectrum allocation (Bae, Beigman, Berry, Honig & Vohra 2008) . The interaction of primary and secondary operators is usually modeled as a monopoly market. For example, in (Jia, Zhang, Zhang & Liu 2009 ) the authors consider a setting where each primary license holder sells his idle spectrum channels to a set of secondary users and show that the optimal auction yields higher profit but results in inefficient allocation. A similar monopolistic setting is considered in (Gao, Wang, Xu & Zhang 2011) and (Gopinathan & Li 2011) . In (Chun & La 2013) , a multi-item optimal auction is used by a primary service provider to allocate his channels to a set of secondary service providers while satisfying at the same time his own needs. It can be argued that even in oligopoly spectrum markets is highly probable that the PO -SO interaction will result in spectrum allocation that is not efficient from the perspective of the controller. All these works analyze exclusively the primary -secondary operator interactions without taking into account the hierarchical structure of the spectrum markets. This hierarchical aspect is studied in (Niyato & Hossain 2010) where the authors consider a multi-layer spectrum market and present a mechanism to match the demand and the spectrum supply of the interrelated spectrum markets in the different layers. Similar models have been considered in (Duan, Huang & Shou 2012) and (Kasbekar, Altman & Sarkar 2009) where the buyer demand is considered known. However, in these studies there is no misalignment among the objectives of the various entities (operators, users, etc) since they all maximize the revenue or the allocative efficiency. Hierarchical auctions have been also studied for general network resource allocation problems (Tang & Jain 2012) . It is explained that due to the different objectives among the first layer auctioneer (initial resource owner) and the intermediaries, the overall resource allocation is either inefficient or untruthful. In (Bitsaki, Stamoulis & Courcoubetis 2006) , the authors study a two-layer market for bandwidth allocation in wireline networks and draw similar conclusions. Moreover, they propose a solution that is based on ascending auctions. A prerequisite for the efficient allocation of bandwidth is that either the payment rule of the lower-level auction is selected by the social planner (the auctioneer at the first layer) or the end-clients (bidders at the second layer) should be able to select their seller (move to another market).
In the setting under consideration the entities in the different layers have conflicting interests and there is lack of information about the actual demand in each layer. The intermediaries (second layer auctioneers) have non-zero valuations for the spectrum, and are allowed to select the auction scheme that yields for them the maximum possible revenue. The controller (social planner) does not issue strict regulatory rules, e.g. does not impose the payment scheme of the lower level market. Hence, there is a need for novel resource allocation mechanisms.
1.3.4
Mechanisms for efficient hierarchical spectrum allocation
Obviously, the most suitable solution for these spectrum allocation problems would be to have a central regulator that would continuously redistribute the spectrum to both primary and secondary users and ensure maximum possible efficiency. Since most probably this may not be realizable, one has to find other mechanisms to ensure the overall objective (efficiency or revenue) in the presence of these spectrum allocation hierarchies. An idea towards this direction is to use score auctions (Milgrom 2004) . Namely, the seller on the top of each hierarchy can run an auction to allocate spectrum, but he does not simply consider the bids of buyers. Instead, he uses additional criteria that capture the bidders behavior when they act as sellers for the next layer market. For example, the top auctioneer can employ an enhanced auction mechanism considering the feedback from bottom layer buyers. This type of auctions provide incentives to the intermediaries to comply with the goal of the top layer auctioneer and reduce their revenue in favor of the benefit of bottom layer entities. A type of auctions that fits into this context are Sponsored Search Auctions (SSA) which were discussed previously. It is both interesting and challenging to devise spectrum allocation mechanisms based on this 3-party auction machinery. For example, consider a setting where secondary users will provide feedback to primary operators for the quality of channels they received from the secondary operators. This feedback can be similar to the Click Through Rate (CTR) parameters that are used in SSAs. Similarly, in the hierarchical spectrum allocation instance depicted in the left side of Figure 1 .3 (CO-POs-SOs), secondary oper- ators can provide feedback to the controller so as to reveal the selfish revenuemaximizing strategy of POs. Accordingly, the controller may use this information to favor the primary operators that charge lower prices to SOs. Clearly, this type of multi-layer auctions are expected to enhance overall spectrum allocation.
Let us consider a representative three layer hierarchical spectrum market and give a simple numerical example of a feedback-assisted channel allocation. In the top of the hierarchy there is one socially-aware spectrum regulator who allocates 40 channels to each one of two revenue-maximizing operators and every operator in turn serves 30 users. User needs are private information, but their distribution (c.d.f.) is uniform and known to operators and the regulator. In Figure 1 .5 we plotted the overall system efficiency, i.e. the sum of the winning users valuations versus the number of allocated channels for two scenarios: (i) when channels are allocated by operators using an optimal auction scheme that maximizes their expected revenue, and (ii) when channels are allocated directly by the regulator to users using an efficient auction such as the VCG auction. The intervention of operators in the spectrum distribution process is shown to introduce significant efficiency loss which increases with the number of channels. Now assume that one of the two operators is socially-aware while the other one is a selfish revenue-maximizing market entity. In this setting, a simple method to increase the overall efficiency of the hierarchical allocation is to have the regulator to allocate more channels to the efficient operator and fewer to the selfish operator. This is a simple yet effective method for increasing the efficiency of overall channel allocation. Nevertheless, the regulator most probably will not be aware of the exact objective and strategy of operators. Hence, he has to receive and exploit some kind of feedback provided by the users so as to determine the optimal channel allocation to the operators.
An hierarchical mechanism that addresses these issues is presented in detail in (Iosifidis, Chorppath, Alpcan & Koutsopoulos 2012) . The main idea of the proposed scheme is to allow the regulator (the top-layer auctioneer) to employ a novel channel allocation and pricing scheme that will induce the intermediaries (e.g., the primary operators) to redistribute the channels in a (more) sociallyaware fashion. This hierarchical allocation scheme is in essence a combined auction and reimbursement pricing mechanism, based on optimal auctions, which yields a balanced outcome through a weighted some of welfare and revenue for the POs.
1.4
Double auction mechanism for secondary spectrum markets
Background
A particular characteristic of the emerging dynamic spectrum markets is that they aim to facilitate spectrum and bandwidth exchange among peer network entities as it is depicted in Figure 1 .1. Namely, in these markets, secondary operators will be able to directly interact and redistribute the spectrum they acquired from the primary operators, in a finer spatio-temporal scale. Similarly, users are expected to form clusters and route each others traffic so as to satisfy their communication needs in an ad-hoc fashion. In detail, consider the following two scenarios:
• Users exchange routing services. Users form an ad-hoc network and each one of them, along with his own traffic, routes also the traffic of other users.
• Secondary operators exchange their spectrum. SOs exchange for certain time period their leased spectrum in order to satisfy the highly dynamic communication needs of their users.
These examples have certain common properties that call for novel network management schemes and protocols. Specifically, there exist many resource (spectrum or routing services) buyers and sellers. Each entity is at the same time a buyer and seller, i.e. both consuming and providing resources. Moreover, these two roles are intertwined. For example, users utilize their bandwidth either for forwarding their own traffic (client role) or for routing the traffic of other users (server role). The interests of the different entities are very often conflicting. An operator would like to lease spectrum from another operator at the minimum possible price and sell his own spectrum at the highest price. Also, a user prefers other users to forward his traffic while he is not willing to spend his probably scarce capacity for serving them. The interactions and transactions among these entities should be realized in an almost real-time fashion. The entities most often interact and coordinate in a decentralized fashion, i.e. without the intervention of a central authority such as a network controller. Therefore all the required protocols and market-clearing algorithms must be amenable to distributed execution.
In the sequel we present a double auction mechanism that addresses the challenges above and ensures the successful operation of secondary spectrum markets. We model node interaction through market transactions. Each node (either user or SO) announces one separate bid for buying resource (spectrum or bandwidth) from any potential seller, and one bid for selling resource to any potential buyer. The bids represent nodes willingness for acquiring or selling the resource. Sellers receive bids from buyers and need to decide how to allocate their resource and how much to charge for that. On the other hand, buyers receive resource offers and need to select the sellers to which they submit bids for resource request. Each node must decide how much portion of the resource it will dedicate to serving others and to receiving service itself, so as to maximize its benefit. The latter is usually captured by a utility function which can include charging and reimbursement for resource exchanges.
A fundamental characteristic of the model is that we assume a perfect competition market. In other words, we consider that nodes, sellers or buyers, are price-takers. This means that they do not anticipate the impact of their bidding strategy to the announced prices. This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows us to derive a social-welfare-maximizing mechanism with low computational and communication requirements. Price-taking behavior is highly probable to arise in settings where the number of nodes is large, (Roberts & Postlewaite 1976) , (Johansen 1977) , or when each node is not aware of the strategy space and the actions of other nodes. An interesting explanation about the intuition and the implications of assuming that nodes of a network are pricetakers is given in (Stoenescu & Teneketzis 2005) . Additionally, in the context of large-scale wired networks there exists a large volume of works, originating from the seminal paper by Kelly (Kelly 1997) , studying mechanisms for bandwidth allocation among competing but price-taking nodes.
The works (Dimakis et al. 2006) and (Jain & Varaiya 2005 ) study double auction methods for link capacity allocation in networks. In (Dimakis et al. 2006) , each link sells its bandwidth and each node bids for the allocation of bandwidth in a bundle of links. A central agent collects these bids and determines bandwidth allocations and payments by solving the social welfare maximization problem. These schemes are not directly applicable to decentralized settings such as networks since they require a central auctioneer. In (Wu, Chen, Xu & Guo 2007) , the authors present a double auction mechanism for routing protocols in mobile ad-hoc networks. Multiple source-destination pairs interact with a set of intermediate relay nodes in order to allocate their traffic in a cost-efficient way.
The authors prove that this mechanism ensures node cooperation through proper payments.
The main innovation of the presented approach compared to these works is that it addresses the simultaneous double role of each node as resource seller and buyer, the fact that one role affects the other, and the objective of each node to bid for buying and offering resource to any other node in a distributed fashion. Additionally, by assuming that nodes are price-takers, we manage to derive a mechanism with low computational complexity and reduced communication burden.
System model
We will focus on the scenario where secondary users exchange bandwidth by routing each others traffic. Namely, we consider a group of N nodes (users) that form a wireless ad-hoc network. Each node strives to maximize his own perceived satisfaction. We adhere to the scenario where a node may interact potentially with any other node in a full mesh topology. Depending on the specific network instance, a node may interact with a subset of the group. Node interactions entail routing services exchange which is directly translated into consumption of respective amounts of bandwidth. Node i possesses a finite amount of capacity of C i units that is available for provisioning to others or for satisfying its own needs, potentially from other nodes. Henceforth we use terms "resource" and "service" to refer to this exchange. For any pair of interacting nodes i, j denote by x ij the amount of resource that node i spends for satisfying its own needs through node j. Denote by y ij the amount of resource granted from i to j, namely the amount that node i uses to satisfy j's needs. Clearly, node i can satisfy its needs through node j only if j grants the corresponding amount of resource, namely it is y ji = x ij .
Specifically, x ij is the amount of capacity (bandwidth) that node i spends to forward its own traffic to node j (which will then spend equal capacity y ji to forward it further), and y ij is the rate i dedicates to forwarding traffic of j. We define the vectors x i = (x ij : j = 1, . . . , N ), and y i = (y ij : j = 1, . . . , N ). Thus, network operation is represented by the N × N resource request and allocation matrices X = (x i : i = 1, ..., N ) and Y = (y i : i = 1, ..., N ). The amounts of resource that node i uses for its own needs and for serving others' needs satisfy
Each node i is characterized by a utility function J i (·). We assume that J i (·) is separable, in the sense that J i (x i , y i ) = j =i J ij (x ij , y ij ), where J ij (·) is the perceived utility of node i due to its interaction with node j. This models the general case where node i obtains different utility from different nodes j due to the different importance or timeliness of service, or other properties such as the quality of the spectrum band, etc. Moreover, we assume that the utility function is further decomposed into two components: (i) one component for the client (buyer) side. Let U ij (x ij ) be the utility of node i from satisfying its own needs by using amount x ij through node j. Function U ij (·) is differentiable, strictly concave, positive and increasing; (ii) one component for the server (seller) operation of the node. Let W ij (y ij ) be the cost incurred if node i provides resource amount y ij to node j. This is also a differentiable and strictly concave function. However, this function is negative and decreasing, since service provisioning results in consumption of the node resources. Additionally, for the case of SOs spectrum exchange, W ij (·) captures the opportunity cost of operator i for leasing his spectrum to operator j. Therefore, the utility function of node i can be written as:
(1.22)
The most common and straightforward criterion that quantifies efficient operation of a group of nodes is the maximization of the sum of node utility functions, known as social welfare. The socially optimal operating point of the group is the solution to the social welfare problem (SWP):
(1.23) subject to:
The SWP problem has a unique solution since the objective function is strictly concave and the constraint set is convex. We relax constraints and define the Lagrangian:
where λ = (λ i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N ) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) corresponding to capacity constraints. Also R = (r ij : i, j = 1, . . . , N ) is the N × N matrix of the Lagrange multipliers r ij corresponding to the equality constraints. The optimal primal variables X * , Y * and dual variables λ * , R * satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions:
The optimal solution of SWP, namely the operation point at which the efficiency of node interaction is maximized satisfies equations (A1)-(A6). However, the group consists of rational and selfish agents whose interests are not aligned with the social objective. Selfish nodes act towards maximizing their own utility function, a strategy which clearly results in the degradation of the group operation. In the sequel, we present a double auction method to achieve the optimal operating point of the group in a distributed fashion in the presence of price-taking selfish nodes.
1.4.3
The double auction mechanism
We derive first a central agent aided algorithm to find an efficient rate allocation.
Recall that we impose the requirement that user utility functions are private to each user. SWP cannot be solved by a single central agent due to lack of knowledge on node utilities. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a double auction mechanism which is inspired from the algorithm in (Kelly et al. 1998) . Given that nodes are rational utility maximizers and price-takers, this mechanism will induce an allocation that maximizes social welfare, i.e. it is the solution of SWP. Each node i submits buy (ask) bids p ij for receiving the available resource of node j = 1, . . . , N , and sell (offer) bids a ij for granting its entire resource to each node j. These bids are collected by the central controller which subsequently determines (i) the resource allocation regimes (X, Y), (ii) the charging and reimbursement amounts, h(p ij ) and l(a ij ) respectively, for each pair of interacting nodes i and j. By h(·) and l(·) we denote the charges and reimbursements as continuous functions of submitted buy and sell bids respectively. The controller resource allocation is derived from the solution of a certain optimization problem. The charging and reimbursement amounts are calculated through functions h(·) and l(·). The key challenge is to come up with the structure of optimization problem and functions h(·) and l(·) such that the resource allocation coincides with the optimal solution of SWP, defined by equations (A1)-(A6).
The controller anticipates rational behavior by users in the process of selecting their bids. Each bidder in turn knows the resource allocation problem and charging and reimbursement functions and attempts to find buy and sell bidding strategies that optimize its net benefit. That is, each node i solves the following 2(N − 1) problems (NODE problems):
Notice that x ij and y ij depend on respective bids, p ij and a ij .
For the problem at hand, we propose that the controller should determine the optimal allocation from the solution of the following optimization problem (Network Controller Problem, NCP):
. . , N and x ij = y ji for all i, j = i. Note that the objective function is selected such that it is strictly concave. The NCP problem has unique solution which satisfies KKT conditions:
a ij ∀ i, j, i = j, and four additional conditions, call them (B3)-(B6) which are identical to (A3)-(A6). These are the optimal amounts of resource that each node i should receive and provide according to the controller problem. They depend on node i bids and on dual variables (and through them, on other nodes' bids). Note that the amount of resource x ij which is granted to i is proportional to its bid p ij . On the other hand, the resource y ij granted by node i to j is inversely proportional to the charging bid a ij . Comparing the solutions of SWP and NCP, one can see that if nodes submit their bids as follows:
then equations (B1)-(B6) are identical to equations (A1)-(A6). The bid expressions above hold if the charging and reimbursement functions are chosen as follows:
Then, the proposed mechanism achieves the socially optimal solution. These charging and reimbursement rules are quite intuitive: each node as client (resource consumer) is charged exactly the amount he bids, namely the amount it declared it is willing to pay. On the other hand, its reimbursement is inversely proportional to the submitted sell bid. That is, nodes that submit high offers to sell the good finally receive less money. Implicit here is the assumption that nodes are price takers. The mechanism is executed in successive rounds, each round t with the following steps:
• Each node i solves the NODE problems and calculates p (t) ij and a (t) ij , separately for each node j it interacts with.
• The central controller collects all bids and solves NCP. It then allocates the current optimal amounts of resource x (t) ij and y (t) ij and determines the charges h(p (t) ij ) and reimbursements l (t) (a ij ). Finally, it communicates the new Lagrange multipliers.
The bids calculated in each iteration round are not the final ones in (G1) and (G2). After each iteration, the solution of NODE problem changes due to the updated Lagrange multipliers. Indeed, the NODE problem is solved by substituting variables x ij and y ij from the previous round and optimizing with respect to new bids p ij and a ij . Calculation of derivatives at each step leads to equations U ′ ij (x ij ) = p ij /x ij and W ′ ij (y ij ) = −a ij y ij , for the client and server operation of the node. These are fed to the controller, which then computes the new allocations.
The iterative procedure converges and the final bids equal to the social optimal bids p * ij and a * ij . Therefore, nodes finally bid according to (G1) and (G2). This shows that the solution of NCP, together with node rationality (which induces nodes to optimize their strategy in a prescribed way), achieves the socially optimal point, at which nodes receive and provide resources according to the solution of SWP. It is interesting to notice that this mechanism allows the nodes to adjust their buyer and seller roles so as to maximize their own utility. In Figure 1 .6 we compare the net utility of two nodes that follow different resource allocation strategy. One of them dynamically adjusts his buyer -seller role according to the presented algorithm, while the other one has decided to use 30% of his total bandwidth to serving other nodes and 70% to receiving service himself. We see that the dynamic adjustment results in higher utility and, as it is shown in the lower plot, is more resilient to node churn.
We now discuss a variant of the double auction mechanism that is realizable for clearing markets and resource exchange without presuming the presence of a central coordinator or a controller. For example, this scheme is very important for the management of ad-hoc networks that are formed by the users. Controller tasks such as resource allocation, charging and reimbursement decisions are undertaken by nodes in a distributed way. These tasks are accomplished by solving the NCP problem in a decentralized fashion using dual decomposition for any given set of bids. We relax constraints and define the Lagrangian for the NCP: where R, λ are the Lagrange multipliers defined previously. By exploiting the separability properties of L(·), we can derive a distributed primal-dual algorithm for the solution of this problem (Iosifidis & Koutsopoulos 2010) . Namely, the distributed execution is realized in an iterative fashion that finally converges to the optimal solution. In every round, each node i independently maximizes L(·) with respect to x ij and y ij , ∀ j. This yields the optimal resource allocation and request decisions for the current round. Accordingly, the node calculates the optimal pricing and reimbursement amounts using eq. (1.30). Finally, he minimizes L(·) with respect to λ ij and r ij , ∀ j, by using a gradient algorithm. The updated dual variables are announced to the other nodes. The details of this iterative distributed algorithm can be found in (Iosifidis & Koutsopoulos 2010) .
The described double auction scheme exhibits certain very important properties which were further studied in (Iosifidis, Gao, Huang & Tassiulas 2013) . Specifically, apart from inducing the bidders (buyers and sellers) to gradually reveal their true needs, it also ensures that the auctioneer will not loose money, i.e. the payments to the sellers will not exceed the payments from the buyers. In other words, this double auction is (weak) budget balanced. Additionally, the mechanism is individual rational meaning that participants (both buyers and sellers) will not have negative net utilities. These characteristics are very important especially for double auctions, which, as it was proved in the seminal work (Myerson & Satterthwaite 1983) , cannot be concurrently efficient, incentive compatible, individual rational and budget balanced. Under the assumption of price-taking behavior, the discussed mechanism satisfies all these requirements.
Conclusions
Two fundamental aspects of the emerging dynamic spectrum markets is the multi-layer hierarchical spectrum allocation among different network entities (primary/secondary operators/users), and the dynamic trading of spectrum among peer entities (operators or users) motivated by their rapidly changing needs. To address these issues, it is required to redesign market mechanisms and specifically to devise novel auction schemes that are suitable for these multilateral and almost real-time transactions in the presence of limited information about spectrum availability and demand. First, we focused on the hierarchical spectrum allocation schemes and explained through examples that current auctions are not appropriate for these settings and cannot ensure the overall efficient spectrum allocation. Accordingly, we presented a simple mechanism that can improve the efficiency of these hierarchical markets. The main idea is to utilize feedback from the buyers in the lower market level and incentivize the intermediaries, who resell the spectrum, to allocate and price it in a (more) socially efficient fashion. Accordingly, we introduced a framework for spectrum management and bandwidth exchange based on a lightweight double auction mechanism. The interacting entities (nodes) can be secondary operators who exchange spectrum or users routing each others traffic in an ad-hoc fashion. The novel attribute of this framework is that it optimally captures the tradeoff of resource sharing between the resource provider and consumer roles of each network entity (user of operator).
